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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction in this court is proper pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (j) (1953, as amended).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

When a motor vehicle owner such as Agency meets its

financial responsibility through self-funded coverage, is the selffunded liability coverage secondary and excess over the insurance
provided

(pursuant

to express

contractual

agreement

between

rental agency and the renter) by the vehicle operator/renter?

the
The

summary judgment, which presents a conclusion of law, is reviewed for
correctness, according no deference to the trial court.

DeBrv v.

Salt Lake County, 835 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1992) (citing Bonham v.
Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989)).
2.

When a motor vehicle owner such as Agency meets its

financial responsibility through self-funded coverage, is the selffunded personal injury protection coverage secondary and excess over
the insurance provided

(pursuant to express contractual agreement

between the rental agency and the renter) by the vehicle operator/
renter?

The summary judgment, which presents a conclusion of law, is

reviewed for correctness, according no deference to the trial court.
DeBrv v. Salt Lake County, 835 P.2d 981, 984

(Utah 1992)

(citing

Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989)).
3.

If this court determines that Agency's self-funded

coverage is primary, is Agency nevertheless permitted to recover the
amount it might ultimately pay from Jorgina Chambers, pursuant to her

1

contract with Agency?

DeBry v. Salt Lake County. 835 P.2d 981, 984

(Utah 1992) (citing Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989)).
4.

Regardless of whether Agency's self-funded coverage is

primary or secondary, was the trial court correct in its apparent
ruling that Agency must provide double the statutorily
minimum limits?

required

DeBry v. Salt Lake County. 835 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah

1992) (citing Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497, 499 (Utah 1989)).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The following statutes, as they existed in December, 1989,
control this case:
31A-4-102,

and

Utah Code Ann. §§ 31A-22-302, -304, 31A-1-301,

41-12a-407.

The

language

of

these

statutes

is

reproduced at Addendum A to this Brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an action for declaratory relief filed by plaintiffs to determine obligations to indemnify Jorgina Chambers, under
Utah's financial responsibility laws.
Course of Proceedings
This appeal is from a final judgment of the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, wherein
the court granted summary judgment on plaintiff's claim against this
defendant/appellant (Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc.) determining obligations
under the financial responsibility laws in the State of Utah.

2

Statement of Facts
The following

facts were either set forth pursuant

to

stipulation in Chamber's motion for summary judgment, or set forth
without

objection

in Agency's

response

to

Chamber's

motion

for

summary judgment,
1.

Plaintiff Farmers Insurance Exchange is a reciprocal

or inter-insurance

exchange organized and existing under and by

virtue of the laws of the State of California and authorized to
engage in the insurance business in the State of Utah.
2.

Defendant

Agency

Rent-A-Car,

Inc.

is

(R. 21)
a

Delaware

corporation, authorized to conduct the business of renting automobiles in the State of Utah.
3.

Defendant Royal

(R. 22)
Indemnity Company is an

insurance

company authorized under the laws of the State of Utah to conduct an
insurance business in the State of Utah.
4.

(R. 22)

On or about December 13, 1989, Jorgina Chambers rented

a vehicle, a 1989 Dodge Aries, from Agency Rental, Inc.
5.

(R. 22)

At that time, Jorgina Chambers owned a 1985 Chevrolet

Sprint which was insured under a policy issued by Farmers Insurance
Exchange with policy limits of $20,000 for injury to one person,
$40,000 for injuries per occurrence and $10,000 medical limits.

(R.

22)
6.

Agency Rental, Inc. at all times relevant hereto is a

qualified self-insurer under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 4112a-406 (1986) and was certified as such by the Utah Department of
Public Safety.

(R. 22)
3

7.

On December

14, 1989 a collision occurred

at the

intersection of 4505 South and 1175 West in Salt Lake County which
involved the 1989 Dodge owned by Agency Rental, Inc. and driven by
Jorgina Chambers, and a vehicle driven by A.C. Gomez.
8.

(R. 23)

A.C. Gomez, at all times relevant hereto, was insured

under a policy of automobile liability insurance issued by Royal
Indemnity Company.
9.

(R. 23)

Morgan Chambers was a passenger in the vehicle driven

by Jorgina Chambers and owned by Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc.
10.
by A.C. Gomez.
11.

(R. 23)

Geraldine Gomez was a passenger in the vehicle driven
(R. 23)
As a result of the accident, Morgan Chambers sustained

catastrophic injuries.

Her medical expenses to date exceed $70,000.

(R. 23)
12.
protection

Agency accepted responsibility for personal

coverage, but

primarily liable.
13.

it does not

accept

that

it

injury

should

be

(R. 40)

In all of its rental agreements, Agency requires its

renters to specifically sign the following agreement:
Customer represents and warrants that he has a
valid policy of automobile liability, collision
and comprehensive insurance in force at the time
of this rental and further represents and
warrants that he shall maintain said policy of
automobile insurance in force during the term of
this rental. Lessor, relying on said warranty
and representation, is not providing automobile
liability,
collision,
comprehensive
and/or
medical expense insurance to the Customer or any
person operating, using or otherwise occupying
said vehicle.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

A certificate of self-funded coveraqe is not the ecr i .. -J .

shift risk
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Agree-:
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•, self-insurer is prohibitea from entering into a risk

shifting agreement hv t h a ct~ite Insurance Code.

This conclusion is

supportea

.. . 3

that have looked at this issue.
2.

' * \aenrv' - -^lf- funded

coverage i.,
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rental driver.
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Accordingly, Agency is n. ' deprived of the benefit of
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Agency is entitled to recover from Jorgina Chambers any amount it
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requirement
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ir^t

r .o
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t:or vehicle
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operating

under
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^ r~ liable for double (or
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ARGUMENT
Introduction
B -

:

-ri *-«-

*s

ruling and did ni. specifically address each of plaintiff's submis5

sions, an explanatory note may be helpful as this Court considers the
issues that are on appeal.
First, Agency is appealing from the trial court's decision
that

Agency

obligation

must
set

Second, Agency

provide

forth

in

primary
Utah's

coverage
Financial

under

the

liability

Responsibility

laws.

is asking this Court to address the question of

whether Agency has the primary obligation to provide Personal Injury
Protection benefits to the plaintiff.
Even

though

Agency

has

voluntarily

reimbursed

Royal

Insurance for the Personal Injury Protection benefits paid by Royal,
Agency submits that the issue of primary versus secondary personal
injury protection coverage is before the court, because the court did
apparently rule that Agency was primary for all required benefits.
Agency

recognizes

that

specifically states that:

the

personal

injury

protection

statute

"Primary coverage is given by the policy

insuring the motor vehicle in use during the accident."

Utah Code

Ann. § 31A-22-309(4) . (Emphasis added.) However, Agency submits, as
set forth below, that the only insurance policy at issue was that
provided by plaintiff, Farmers.

Indeed, as is also argued below,

Agency could not issue insurance if it wanted to. Therefore, despite
the language on which Farmers and the Utah State Insurance Commission
have relied, the primary versus secondary coverage issue is the same
for both liability coverage and personal injury protection.

Agency

submits that the issue is squarely before this court and that it
would be a waste of judicial resources to not address both issues at
this time.
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Finally, as an introductory matter, Agency reiterates
ui L u cons ideivj

he
;

/

disposition;. rtt Lriat time, uiic uouiL expressed concern with regard
tc:i whether this matter was ripe for appeal because this action was
apparenl I y

lluwevoi ,
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1

WH

•> i < unhinged

by Agency subsequent L O I :ie summary judgment decision.

Royal was

always aware they would be reimbursed by either Farmers ^

Agency,
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tion of the significant legal issues presented by this appeal because
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*- ^

final iudcrment against

-- -; -'--" *<•*

I. . THE FARMERS' INSURANCE POLICY . :COVERAGE TO JORGINA CHAMBERS.
The principal issue on appeal ^
self-funded

coverage

in

-

,;ra:i'^"

-: -*

insurance p, —->
forth

.h

valid

and

"\*

i^su^a . . .. orgina Chambers.

. ^^

collectible
*

.

• ;

Therefore,
I I III I

i

L.iv. reasons set

section, self-funded coverage :I s not

iLate

1 ,,!' Ill

"other

r n F \ I I r a r i < " " e r'e1111 i i i • 11 <-i11 «• i< j r PPITI»• > i it r <; i j 111 i f f i• i MI-'

forbidden
agreements

wnetner a ceriiticate ^f

-

.:-- Subpart

i. n s i n " a r 1 f"'P ,

f M l l M i i ' ! in 11

constitutes

. ..• 3 PKlMARi

Insurance
the

Code

certificate

II | | , <

I

from

cnieni]^

of

self-funded

; j,"

II

., ,

p

P. gei IC y :i s

ii lto such
coverage
i. HI 1 i i i

;j

riS

that nave considered this issue have also concluded that self-funded
coverage is not insurance.
tl"] :i s si

These cases are discussed in Subpart B of

r Itviii' i uasuiui

(

Ayi.'in

7

,||
|II

,; i

t " i i i l 1t "df. H; ;

. .-i

coverage could not constitute "other insurance" as that phrase is
used in the Farmers' policy.
A.
A Certificate of Self-funded Coverage is Not Insurance; Agency
is Prohibited by Utah Law from Writing Insurance.
In the proceedings below, the trial court adopted plaintiff's position that a person holding a certificate of self-funded
coverage stands in the shoes of an insurer for all intents and
purposes.

This conclusion was premised on the language of Utah Code

Ann. § 41-12a-407 in effect at the relevant time, which stated that
a holder of a certificate of self-funded coverage agrees to:
. . . pay benefits to persons injured from the
self-funded person's operation, maintenance, and
use of motor vehicles as would an insurer issuing a policy to the self-funded person containing the coverages under Section 31A-22-302.
U.C.A. § 41-12a-407 (1988)
Based on this language, the court apparently concluded that a certificate holder acts as an insurer, not only for itself, but for all
permissive users of the holder's vehicle.

Pursuant to this reason-

ing, the court held that the certificate of self-funded coverage
becomes

"other collectible

insurance" within the meaning of the

Farmers' policy and therefore becomes primary.
This conclusion is entirely unsupportable.
of self-funded coverage is not insurance.

A certificate

One need only read the

definition of insurance contained in the State Insurance Code in
effect at the relevant time to confirm this.

Insurance is defined in

§ 31A-1-3 01 of the insurance code as "any arrangement, contract, or
plan for the transfer of a risk or risks from one or more persons to
one or more persons . . . ."

Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-301.
8

Thus, the

essential element of insurance is a risk shifting agreement between
- — .---•
Lii-

iiisureci ^gainst

,.. ch the insurer agrees to indemnify
even

_LO^S,

.LOSS

caused W

t.

insured's own

negligence.

For example, when Ms. Chambers purchased her automobile

the* premiu.i

r armers' agreeo ;^.< assume Lii^

financial

JLISK

LnaL diie might in-,:ur

"liability as the result of her negligent operation of a
-•••

< hii;inil »"' , F ,s

"• - * -*•' -

•

' " -

•

* i

D

shift the risk of financial i-L.abii±Ly fi^iu Chambers L O Farmers, is an
example of insurance.
I

.nit r m l , I m
I'

not insurance.

i q r e e n t e i t t bttt *'Oi*n A g e w

I ' Luiil \ i, w a s

Agency received no premium from Chambers

Agency

made r^ agreement 1~^ indemnify Chambers f or loss she might incur as
• ; . . »d
Chambers t<. sign
policy of

,

r

acknowledgement

-^sur^ her *^r arpr liabild^v that might arise

nsuranc^ ^

from her optid -

tnat Chambers had 3 n place a

.-._,-„ ,

Further, and most significantly, Agency could not have
insured Chambers had

Code.

wanted to,

Thi° conclusion ^c mandated by

Section 31A-4-102 prohibits any person from doing an insurance

businesr "

7tah except an insurer authorized to do business under

Chapter
Code

Ann.

.-- Insurance Code
§ 31A-4-102.

"Insurance

( B) pr o j i d i n g D t h e r p*' rr(40).

Utah Code Ann. *

business"

includes:

:'.v-v - . - - > - = •

' •

»»

Utah

- - .*

n

J t.^i.aiiiuu d L o w , ^s^rance .^s
9

defined as any agreement between two or more persons to shift risk.
Agency Rent-A-Car is not a qualified insurer.

Therefore, it is

forbidden by law from entering into agreements with any other parties
to insure them by shifting the risk of financial liability from that
party to Agency.

Yet this is exactly what the court below ruled when

it held that the agreement between Agency and Chambers constituted
"other collectible insurance."
It therefore becomes obvious that the court below misconstrued Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-407 (2) when it ruled that that statute
made

a

certificate

insurance.

of

self-funded

coverage

the

equivalent

of

Under the correct interpretation of § 41-12a-407(2), a

certificate of self-funded coverage is analogous to a bond rather
than to a policy of insurance.

The holder of a certificate of self-

funded coverage agrees to respond and pay damages for any injury
resulting from its "operation, maintenance, and use of its motor
vehicle."

Operation and use of its motor vehicles includes rental of

those motor vehicles to third parties such as Ms. Chambers.

Agency

did not agree with Chambers to indemnify her for her negligence.
However,

by

operation

of

the

statute,

Agency

is

obligated

to

indemnify third-parties for injuries caused by the rental driver to
the same extent an insurer would be.

Its liability is, however,

derivative and arises by operation of statute rather than pursuant to
a risk shifting agreement between Agency and its renter.

It is this

lack of agreement to shift risk that prevents the relationship from
constituting insurance.

Thus, like the issuer of a bond, the holder

of a certificate of self-funded coverage agrees to stand jointly
10

liable with

Ani,

T

r>-- tortfeasor.

ds ^:^ . ne case of a

The reference ro insurance i r. c? c'-ir'a-

JJULU

like rh^ issuer of the bo-n

. m e r e is iu shifting o: iisk because,
rhp nolde:

^

^ •"<r-rt-? f i cate ^f s e f -

tortfeasor.
T'V^O i a.-v r-.f ^ risk shifting agreement precludes a ^ertifiCd_H

j

i] :i f> :i i lg s ., 3 other

insurance •..:.-:• ; the Farmers' polic\
on]-

r~-i

.,-..-

OI

. J- -e Jtit le

"Therefore, because it is the

insurance, the Farmers'

insurance policy

must be

pr

-

B.

Other States Hold that Seit-runded Coverage is Not Insurance.
Home Indemnity Co. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co. , 314 S.W 2d

ri._a-;, .
stands

~.~

,-J.I i^,^„

coverage ^

..... insurance.

Humble ax so

for t .-. proposition that the self-funded operator has the

In Humble, the defendant, AiUiij^j.o ,. - ^ « Refining wO . J icr ± u d cert 1.1 i •cate
"T"

self-insurance

ir^•

i '

I I III! Il

I IHl'jed

to a Humble employee.

on
H

. :.s

P<

vehicles
H i l l ! i "ill! > b il I (:*'"

iaintiff,
.

Home
: -

*

L^: ap^xicaLxe Texas statute required a self-

insurer to
Pay on behait ot the insured named therein and
any other person, as insured, using any such
motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the express
or implied permission of such named insured, all
sums which the insured shall become legally
obligated to pay as damages arising out of the
ownership, maintenance ox use of si ich motor
11

vehicle or motor vehicles
States of America.
Id. at 864.

(Emphasis added.)

within

the

United

The employee was involved in an

accident while operating a Humble automobile.

Home Indemnity Co.

brought an action against Humble claiming that Humble was primarily
liable.

The Home's claim was based on its insurance policy that

stated that when the insured was driving any other car than his own
personal car, Home Indemnity was liable only for such damages as
might be assessed against the insured which were not covered by
"other valid and collectible insurance."
The Texas court held that the self-insurer's liability was
secondary to that of the driver.

The court reasoned that the owner

of a motor vehicle under a certificate of self-insurance becomes
jointly liable to the injured party along with the negligent driver
and, by operation of the self-insurance statute, was obligated to
compensate an injured party for negligent acts of the driver.

The

court held that had the injured party sued Humble, Humble could have
brought an action against its employee as the actively negligent
party and recovered judgment against him.

Id. at 865.

The court

observed that this was the exact opposite result from what could have
occurred had the certificate been the equivalent of insurance in
which case, the driver could have brought an action against Humble to
recover damages paid by him in satisfaction of a judgment rendered
against him as the result of negligence.
In Southeast Title and Insurance Company v. Collins, 226
So.2d 247 (Fla. App. 1969) the Florida Court of Appeals cited Humble
in ruling that proof of financial responsibility is not the equiva12

lent of insurance.

The court stressed that shifting of risk is an

essential incident of insurance.

The court reasoned that, because

proof of financial responsibility does not shift risk, it cannot be
considered insurance.

Id. at 248.

The Supreme Court of Louisiana ruled the same way in Hearty
v. Harris, 574 So. 2d 1234 (La. 1991) . The Harris court reasoned that
the only form of automobile liability coverage that can qualify as
insurance is a policy that has been officially certified and issued
by an insurance carrier duly authorized to transact business within
the State

of Louisiana.

certificate

of

requirement.
discussed

Ld. at

self-insurance

1240.

does

The court held

not

meet

the

Therefore, it cannot be considered

previously,

the

same

result

that a

certification
insurance.

is mandated

under

As

Utah's

insurance law.
Finally, the Supreme Court of Missouri also followed Humble
in ruling that a certificate of self-insurance is not the equivalent
of insurance in American Family Mutual Ins. Co. v. Missouri P&L Co.,
517 S.W.2d 110

(Mo. 1974).

The American Family court quoted the

language from the Humble decision that distinguished insurance from
self-insurance on the basis that insurance includes an agreement to
indemnify

the

negligence."

insured

"against

loss,

even

as

against

his

own

Id. at 114 (quoting Humble at 866) . See also Universal

Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Marriott Homes, Inc., 238 So.2d 730,
732

(Ala. 1970)

(Self-insurance

"is actually

insurance as that term is commonly used.")
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the

antithesis

of

The

reasoning

of Humble

and the other

cited

cases is

controlling on the issue of whether self-funded coverage constitutes
"other insurance."

The obligation to pay any other person all sums

which an insurer would have to pay sets forth the limits of the
obligation to indemnify.

It does not make the certificate of self-

funded coverage "insurance".
rather

than

insure,

the

Because the obligation is to indemnify
certificate

cannot

constitute

insurance" as that phrase is used in the Farmers' policy.

"other

Therefore,

the Farmers' insurance policy remains the primary policy.1
II.

SELF-FUNDED PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION IS
SECONDARY AND EXCESS OVER THE INSURANCE
PROVIDED BY THE VEHICLE OPERATOR.
Self-funded Personal Injury Protection (PIP) is secondary

and excess over the insurance provided by the vehicle operator/
renter.

In the proceedings below, Agency stipulated that it would

pay the PIP benefits. However, it disputed that it should be held to
be primarily liable for those benefits.

Agency's position in this

regard is premised on Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(4) which states
that with respect to Personal Injury Protection, "primary coverage is
given by the policy insuring the motor vehicle during the accident."
Utah

Code

Ann.

§ 31A-22-309(4)

(emphasis

added).

Self-funded

Personal Injury Protection is not insurance for the same reason selffunded coverage generally is not insurance.

Because Agency does not

insure, but rather, indemnifies, its coverage cannot be considered a

1

The Humble decision and rationale have been specifically
approved by the Texas Supreme Court. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Zellars,
462 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. 1970).
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"policy insuring the motor vehicle during the accident."

For this

reason, self-funded Personal Injury Protection cannot be primary.
III.

AGENCY'S LIABILITY LIMITS CANNOT EXCEED STATUTORY
MINIMUMS.
The trial court's perfunctory minute entry dated July 14,

1992, did not address the plaintiff's discrete claims for relief.
Plaintiff, however, submitted an order that specifically granted each
of

its

claims.

Agency

objected

to

the

proposed

order,

which

objection was timely filed, but the court entered the order before
the time for objection had run, in clear contravention of Rule 4504(2), Code of Judicial Administration.

Agency's objection was

prompted in large part by the incredible implication of the court's
ruling,

later

ratified

by

the

court's

summary

judgment

order,

apparently holding Agency and all self-funded motor vehicle operators
responsible

for amounts significantly

in excess of the explicit

statutory requirements.
Although

neither

the parties

nor

this

Court

have

the

benefit of any explanation from the trial court, the ruling regarding
limits appears to rely on Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-407, as it existed
at the time of the accident - 1989.

The language of that statute,

however, does not support such a finding.

The statute, as it existed

in 1989, provided as follows:
The department may, upon the application of any
person, issue a certificate of self-funded
coverage when it is satisfied that the person
has, and will continue to have, the ability to
pay judgments in an amount equal to twice the
single limit under subsection 31A-22-304(2) .
Persons holding a certificate of self-funded
coverage under this subsection shall pay bene15

fits to persons injured from the self-funded
person's operation, maintenance, and use of the
motor vehicles as would an insurer issuing a
policy to the self-funded person containing the
coverages under § 31A-22-302. [Emphasis added.]
Section 31A-22-302, in turn, refers to § 31A-22-304 for liability
coverage, which stated limits in 1989 of $20,000 for bodily injury
for one person, and $40,000 because of bodily injury or the death of
two or more persons in any one accident.

The same section set a

minimum limit of $10,000 because of injury to or destruction of
property involved in any one accident.

Nowhere in the statutes

dealing with financial responsibility is a self-funded operator, or
any other operator, required to provide coverages in excess of the
minimums set forth in the foregoing sections.
Section 41-12a-407 set forth above, clearly requires that
a self-insurer have the ability to pay judgments in twice the minimum
limits, but it does not require that a self-funded insurer should pay
that amount.

In fact, the second sentence of the paragraph makes it

clear that the self-funded insurer is held to the same standards as
insurers with respect to limits.

Indeed, as Agency argued at the

hearing on the motion for summary judgment, it is inconsistent for
plaintiff to argue that self-funded coverage is the same as insurance, and then to argue that a self-funded operator should be liable
for totally different limits.

(R. 140)

The amendment to § 41-12a-407, effective 1991, illustrates
even more clearly that it could not have been the

legislature's

intent that self-insurers be responsible for more than the usual
statutory limits.

That is, the amended statute breaks the first
16

paragraph into two subsections.

The first provides that a self-

funded operator which has more than twenty-four vehicles must satisfy
the department that it has at least $200,000 in securities, plus $100
for each motor vehicle up to and including 1,000 and $50 for every
motor vehicle over 1,000 motor vehicles.
407(1)

(1991).

exactly

the

Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-

The second subsection of the statute then reads

same

as

the

second

sentence

of

the

1989

version.

Clearly, the legislature in 1991 did not intend that a self-insurer
owning 24 motor vehicles be subject to minimum liability requirements
of $202,400 per accident, any more than the previous legislature
intended that a self-funded operator be responsible for twice the
minimum limits.
Agency submits that there is a logical basis for a statute
requiring

proof

of

financial

security

and

the

ability

to

judgments in the amount of the minimum limits required by law.

pay
It

makes sense to require that the financial ability exceed one claim at
minimum limits.
at

twice

In fact, the 1989 statute only requiring an ability

the amount

of minimum

limits was arguably

inadequate,

particularly in the case of self-funded operators who maintain large
fleets.

The 1991 amendment addressed that issue.

It did not change

the limits, any more than the earlier statute imposed higher limits.
The purpose of the cited language in both versions of the statute,
was to ensure the availability of minimum limits, not to increase
those limits.

Accordingly, the trial court must be reversed on this

issue and this Court should make it clear that regardless of how an
operator chooses to meet its financial responsibility commitments
17

under the applicable statutes, the limits are uniform with respect to
all operators.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, Agency respectfully
submits that this Court should reverse the trial court's grant of
summary judgment in favor of Farmers and remand the matter to the
trial court with instructions to deny Farmers' motion for summary
judgment.

In addition, this Court should rule as a matter of law

that self-funded motor vehicle operators are required to provide
coverage that is secondary or excess to that provided by insurers,
and that in no event is a self-funded operator required to pay more
than the minimum limits provided by statute at the applicable time.
If***

DATED this <ZLL_1 day of March, 1993.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.

Robert K. Hildef*
Wesley M. Lang
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on the c£_l_ day of March, 1993,
four true and correct copies of BRIEF OF APPELLANT were mailed,
postage prepaid, to:
Andrea C. Alcabes
HANSON, NELSON, CHIPMAN & QUIGLEY
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees
136 South Main, Suite 910
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

INSURERS IN GENERAL
History: C. 1953,31A-4-101, enacted by L.
1985, ch, 242, § 9.

31A-4-104

Meaning of "this code." — See note under
same catchline following § 31A-1-104.

31A-4-102. Qualified insurers.
No person may do an insurance business in Utah, either in person, through
agents or brokers, or through the mail or any other method of communication,
except:
(1) an insurer authorized to do business in Utah under Chapter 5, 6, 7,
8, 9, 10, 11, 13, or 14, within the limits of its certificate of authority;
(2) a joint underwriting group under Section 31A-2-214 or 31A-20-102;
(3) an insurer doing business under Section 31A-15-103;
(4) a person who, pursuant to Section 31A-1-105, submits to the commissioner a certificate from the United States Department of Labor, or
such other evidence as satisfies the commissioner, that the laws of Utah
are preempted with respect to specified activities of that person by Section 514 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 or other
federal law; or
(5) A person exempt from the application of the Insurance Code under
Section 31A-1-103 and all other applicable statutes.
History: C. 1953, 31A-4-102, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 242, § 9; 1987, ch. 91, § 9.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment, in Subsection (2), substituted "31A-2214 or 31A-20-102" for "31A-4-202."

Federal Law. — Section 514 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, referred in Subsection (4), appears as 29
U.S.C. § 1144.
Insurance Code. — See § 31A-M01.

31A-4-103. Certificate of authority.
Each certificate of authority issued by the commissioner shall specify the
name of the insurer, the kinds of insurance it is authorized to transact in
Utah, and any other information the commissioner requires.
History: C. 1953,31A-4-103, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 242, § 9.

Cross-References. — Exemption from fees
of lieutenant governor, § 21-1-2.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 69.
A.L.R. — Liability of insurance agent, for
exposure of insurer to liability, because of issu-

ance of policy beyond authority or contrary to
instructions, 35 A.L.R.3d 907.
Key Numbers. — Insurance *=» 5.

31A-4-104. Bar on local activity by persons not authorized
to do an insurance business.
A person not qualified under Section 31A-4-102 to do an insurance business
may not, from offices or by personnel or facilities located in Utah, solicit
insurance applications or transact insurance business in another jurisdiction.
History: C. 1953,31A-4-104, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 242, § 9.
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GENERAL PROVISIONS

31A-1-301

(37.5) "Individual" means a natural person.
(38) "Inland marine insurance" includes insurance covering:
(a) property in transit on or over land;
(b) property in transit over water by means other than boat or
ship;
(c) bailee liability;
(d) fixed transportation property such as bridges, electric transmission systems, radio and television transmission towers and tunnels; and
(e) personal and commercial property floaters.
(39) "Insolvency" means that an insurer is unable to pay its debts or
meet its obligations as they mature or that an insurer's qualified assets
under Section 31A-17-201 do not exceed its liabilities plus:
(a) (i) minimum required capital; or
(ii) for mutuals, permanent surplus; plus
(b) 30% of the compulsory surplus required to be maintained under
Section 31A-17-302 or 31A-8-210.
For purposes of this definition, "liabilities" includes reserves required
by law, and "qualified assets" includes lk of the maximum total assessment liability of the policyholders of the insurer.
(40) "Insurance" means any arrangement, contract, or plan for the
transfer of a risk or risks from one or more persons to one or more other
persons, or any arrangement, contract, or plan for the distribution of a
risk or risks among a group of persons that includes the person seeking to
distribute his risk. "Insurance" includes:
(a) risk distributing arrangements providing for compensation or
replacement for damages or loss through the provision of services or
benefits in kind;
(b) contracts of guaranty or suretyship entered into by the guarantor or surety as a business and not as merely incidental to a business
transaction; and
(c) plans in which the risk does not rest upon the person who
makes the arrangements, but with a class of persons who have
agreed to share it.
(41) "Insurance adjuster" means a person who directs the investigation, negotiation, or settlement of a claim under an insurance policy other
than life insurance or an annuity, on behalf of an insurer, policyholder, or
a claimant under an insurance policy. Refer also to Subsection
31A-26-102U).
(41.5) "Interinsurance exchange" is defined in Subsection (69).
(42) "Insurance agent" or "agent" means a person who represents insurers in soliciting, negotiating, or placing insurance. Refer to Subsection
31A-23-102(3) for exceptions to this definition.
(43) "Insurance broker" or "broker" means a person who acts in procuring insurance on behalf of an applicant for insurance or an insured, and
does not act on behalf of the insurer except by collecting premiums or
performing other ministerial acts. Refer also to Subsection 31A-23-102(3)
for exceptions to this definition.
(44) "Insurance business" or "business of insurance" includes:
(a) providing health care insurance, as defined in Subsection (35),
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MOTOR VEHICLES

41-12a-407

panied by evidence that there are no unsatisfied liens of any character on the
assets deposited.
(2) The deposit shall be held by the state treasurer in trust to satisfy any
execution on a judgment that would be paid under an insurance policy conforming to Section 31A-22-302 had the treasurer issued such a policy.
(3) Except as provided under Subsection (2), assets deposited with the treasurer under this chapter are exempt from attachment or execution.
History: C. 1953, 41-12a-406, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 48.

41-12a-407. Certificate of self-funded coverage as proof of
owner's or operator's security.
(1) The department may upon the application of any person, issue a certificate of self-funded coverage when it is satisfied that the person has and will
continue to have the ability to pay judgments in an amount equal to twice the
single limit amount under Subsection 3lA-22-304(2). Persons holding a certificate of self-funded coverage under this subsection shall pay benefits to persons injured from the self-funded person's operation, maintenance, and use of
motor vehicles as would an insurer issuing a policy to the self-funded person
containing the coverages under Section 31A-22-302.
(2) Upon not less than five days' notice and a hearing pursuant to the
notice, the department may, upon reasonable grounds, cancel the certificate.
Failure to pay any judgment up to the limit under Subsection 31A-22-304(2)
within 30 days after the judgment is final is a reasonable ground to cancel the
certificate.
History: C. 1953, 4M2a-407, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 48.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Effect of self-insurance.
Liability of county
Self-insurer.
Effect of self-insurance.
Former provision that a self-insurer had to
provide "security equivalent to that offered by
a policy of insurance" did not engraft onto the
statute a\\ benefits 'which may be described as
"standard" insurance policy provisions Foster
v. Salt Lake County, 712 P.2d 224 (Utah 1985).
Liability of county.
Liability of county, as self-insurer of own vehicles operated by permissive users, under former law. See Foster v. Salt Lake County, 7 1 0
P.2d 224 (Utah 1985).

Self-insurer.
Since a certificate of self-insurance is simply
an assurance that judgments will be paid and
is not really insurance or a policy of insurance,
this section, by its own terms, does not require
a self-insurer to provide uninsured motorist
coverage to its passengers American States
Ins Co v Utah Transit Auth., 699 P.2d 1210
(Utah 1985) (decided under similar provisions
of former § 41-12-21.1).
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CONTRACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES

31A-22-302

31A-22-302. Required components of motor vehicle insurance policies — Exceptions.
(1) Every policy of insurance or combination of policies purchased to satisfy
the owner's or operator's security requirement of Section 41-12a-301 shall
include:
(a) motor vehicle liability coverage under Sections 31A-22-303 and
31A-22-304; and
(b) uninsured motorist coverage under Section 31A-22-305, unless affirmatively waived under Subsection 31A-22-305(4).
(2) Every policy of insurance or combination of policies, purchased to satisfy
the owner's or operator's security requirement of Section 41-12a-301, except
for motorcycles, trailers, and semitrailers, shall also include personal injury
protection under Sections 31A-22-306 through 31A-22-309.
(3) First party medical coverages may be offered or included in policies
issued to motorcycle, trailer, and semitrailer owners or operators. These
owners and operators are not covered by personal injury protection coverages
in connection with injuries incurred while operating any of these vehicles.
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-302, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1987, ch. 183, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment, in Subsection (2), inserted "trailers, and
semitrailers", designated the second and third
sentences in former Subsection (2) as Subsec-

tion (3), and, in Subsection (3), in the first sentence inserted "trailer, and semitrailer" and m
the second sentence substituted "These" for
"Motorcycle" and "any of these vehicles" for "a
motorcycle "

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Liability of county.
Uninsured motorist coverage.
—Exclusionary clause
Liability of county.
Liability of county, as self-insurer of own vehicles operated by permissive users, under former law See Foster v Salt Lake County, 712
P 2d 224 (Utah 1985).
Uninsured motorist coverage.
—Exclusionary clause.
Former § 41-12-21 1, which merely required
insurers to offer uninsured motorist coverage

and authorized motorists to waive coverage,
did not require them to allow an individual to
purchase insurance on one vehicle and obtain
coverage on all the other vehicles in his household, a clause excluding such multiple coverage is permissible Clark v State Farm Mut.
Auto Ins Co, 743 P 2d 1227 (Utah 1987)
A policy that covered the insured for any injury caused by an uninsured motorist, excluding therefrom only uninsured "automobiles"
owned by the insured, did not exclude uninsured motorist coverage when the insured was
operating a motorcycle Bear River Mut Ins.
Co v Wright, 770 P 2d 1019 (Utah Ct App
1989).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7 Am Jur 2d Automobile
Insurance § 4.
C.J.S. — 60 C J S . Motor Vehicles § 110.
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of "nofault" automobile insurance plans, 42 A.L R 3d
229
Injury or death caused by assault as within
coverage of no-fault motor vehicle insurance,
44 A L R 4th 1010

Validity, under insurance statutes, of coverage exclusion for injury to or death of insured's
family or household members, 52 A L R 4th 18.
What constitutes "entering" or "alighting
from" vehicle within meaning of insurance policy, or statute mandating insurance coverage,
59 A L R 4th 149
Key Numbers. — Automobiles «=» 144 1(4).
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31A-22-304

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Liability insurance: when is vehicle in "dead storage," 48 A.L.R.4th 591.
Automobile liability insurance policy flight
from police exclusion: validity and effect, 49
A.L.R4th 325.
What constitutes use of vehicle Nin the automobile business" within exclusionary clause of
liability policy, 56 A.L.R.4th 300.

Validity and construction of automobile insurance provision or statute automatically terminating coverage when insured obtains another policy providing similar coverage, 61
A . L i U t h 1130.
What constitutes "motor vehicle" for purposes of no-fault insurance, 73 A.L.R.4th 1053.

31A-22-304. Motor vehicle liability policy minimum limits.
Policies containing motor vehicle liability coverage may not limit the insurer's liability under that coverage below either of the following:
(1) twenty thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of one
person, in any one accident, and, subject to this limit for one person, in
the amount of $40,000 because of bodily injury to or death of two or more
persons in any one accident, and in the amount of $10,000 because of
injury to or destruction of property of others in any one accident; or
(2) forty thousand dollars in any one accident whether arising from
bodily injury to or death of others, or from destruction of or damage to the
property of others.
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-304, enacted by
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Liability of county.
Liability of self-insurers.
Cited.
Liability of county.
Liability of county, as self-insurer of own vehicles operated by permissive users, under former law. See Foster v. Salt Lake County, 712
P.2d 224 (Utah 1985).
Liability of self-insurers.
Public policy as expressed in Utah law is

that self-insurers must provide security for
damages inflicted by themselves, and by permissive users of their vehicles. There is no expressed public policy that would require finding liability based upon mere ownership of a
vehicle. Lane v. Honeywell, Inc., 663 F. Supp.
370 (D. Utah 1987) (decided under former Title
31).
Cited in Wagner v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 786
P.2d 763 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Consortium claim of spouse, parent or child of accident victim as within extended "per accident" rather than "per person"
coverage of automobile liability policy, 46
A.L.R.4th 735.

What constitutes single accident or occurrence within liability policy limiting insurer's
liability to a specified amount per accident or
occurrence, 64 A.L.R.4th 668.
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ADDENDUM B

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MINUTE ENTRY
CHAMBERS, JORGlNA
PLAINTIFF
VS
AGENCY RENT-A-CAR, INC
DEFENDANT

CASE NUMBER 910901699 CV
DATE 07/14/92
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA
COURT REPORTER
COURT CLERK STH

TYPE OF HEARING:
PRESENT:
P. ATTY.
D. ATTY.

PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT HAVING BEEN HEARD
BY THIS COURT AND THE MATTER OF THE COURT'S DECISION HAVING BEEN
TAKEN UNDER ADVISEMENT. THE COURT HAVING CONSIDERED AND NOW
BEING FULLY ADVISED IN THE PREMISES ORDERS MOTION GRANTED.
CC: ANDREA C. ALCABES
ROBERT K. HILDER
MR. GLEN CLEEK

JUL 1 7 1992

ADDENDUM C

JUL 2 7 1992
Oy.S^jfeS

Andrea C. Alcabes, Esq., USB No. 32
HANSON, NELSON, CHIPMAN & QUIGLEY
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
136 South Main Street, Suite 910
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 364-3627

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JORGINA CHAMBERS and
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

©inters

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Judge James S. Sawaya

AGENCY RENT-A-CAR, INC., and
ROYAL INDEMNITY COMPANY,

Civil No. C-91-1699
Defendants.
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment came on for hearing
on

July

6,

1992, the Honorable

James

S.

Sawaya presiding.

Memoranda had been filed by counsel for plaintiffs and counsel
for Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc.

The plaintiffs were represented at

the hearing by counsel, Andrea C. Alcabes.

Defendant Agency

Rent-A-Car, Inc. was represented by counsel, Robert K. Hilder.
Defendant Royal Indemnity Company did not appear.

The court

heard arguments on plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and
took the matter of the court's decision under advisement.
The court having considered and now being fully advised in
the premises, hereby orders that plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment is granted and it is hereby:

ADJUDGED, ORDERED, AND DECREED as follows:
1.

Agency

Rent-A-Car,

Inc.

owes

primary

coverage

for

liability and for personal injury protection benefits for the
accident of December
Agency

Rent-A-Car,

14, 1989, involving a vehicle owned by

Inc.

and

driven by

vehicle driven by A.C. Gomez.

Jorgina

Chambers and

Insurance coverage by Farmers

Insurance Exchange is secondary.
2.

Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. owes liability coverage in the

amount of $80,000.00 for the accident of December

14, 1989,

involving a vehicle owned by Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc. and driven
by Jorgina Chambers and a vehicle owned by A.C. Gomez.
3.

The issue of liability for reimbursement for personal

injury protection coverage is to decided by mandory, binding
arbitration between defendant Royal Indemnity Company and Agency
Rent-A-Car, Inc.
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